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- Ligne n°35 : Identity
- Ligne n°39 : Much of the debate about identity in recent decades has been about
Ligne n°40 : personal identity, and specifically about personal identity over time,
...
Ligne n°39 : ... Much of the debate about identity in recent decades has been about
- Ligne n°40 : personal identity, and specifically about personal identity over time,
- Ligne n°40 : personal identity, and specifically about personal identity over time,
Ligne n°41 : but identity generally, and the identity of things of other kinds, have
...
Ligne n°40 : ... personal identity, and specifically about personal identity over time,
- Ligne n°41 : but identity generally, and the identity of things of other kinds, have
- Ligne n°41 : but identity generally, and the identity of things of other kinds, have
Ligne n°42 : also attracted attention. Various interrelated problems have been at
...
Ligne n°44 : ... focussed particularly on the following areas: the notion of a criterion
- Ligne n°45 : of identity; the correct analysis of identity over time, and, in
- Ligne n°45 : of identity; the correct analysis of identity over time, and, in
Ligne n°46 : particular, the disagreement between advocates of perdurance and
...
Ligne n°46 : ... particular, the disagreement between advocates of perdurance and
- Ligne n°47 : advocates of endurance as analyses of identity over time; the notion of
Ligne n°48 : identity across possible worlds and the question of its relevance to
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Ligne n°47 : ... advocates of endurance as analyses of identity over time; the notion of
- Ligne n°48 : identity across possible worlds and the question of its relevance to
Ligne n°49 : the correct analysis of de re modal discourse; the notion of contingent
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Ligne n°49 : ... the correct analysis of de re modal discourse; the notion of contingent
- Ligne n°50 : identity; the question of whether the identity relation is, or is
- Ligne n°50 : identity; the question of whether the identity relation is, or is
Ligne n°51 : similar to, the composition relation; and the notion of vague identity.
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Ligne n°50 : ... identity; the question of whether the identity relation is, or is
- Ligne n°51 : similar to, the composition relation; and the notion of vague identity.
Ligne n°52 : A radical position, advocated by Peter Geach, is that these debates, as
...
Ligne n°53 : ... usually conducted, are void for lack of a subject matter: the notion of
- Ligne n°54 : absolute identity they presuppose has no application; there is only
Ligne n°55 : relative identity. Another increasingly popular view is the one
...
Ligne n°54 : ... absolute identity they presuppose has no application; there is only
- Ligne n°55 : relative identity. Another increasingly popular view is the one
Ligne n°56 : advocated by Lewis: although the debates make sense they cannot
...
Ligne n°56 : ... advocated by Lewis: although the debates make sense they cannot
- Ligne n°57 : genuinely be debates about identity, since there are no philosophical
Ligne n°58 : problems about identity. Identity is an utterly unproblematic notion.
...
Ligne n°57 : ... genuinely be debates about identity, since there are no philosophical
- Ligne n°58 : problems about identity. Identity is an utterly unproblematic notion.
- Ligne n°58 : problems about identity. Identity is an utterly unproblematic notion.
Ligne n°59 : What there are, are genuine problems which can be stated using the
...
Ligne n°59 : ... What there are, are genuine problems which can be stated using the
- Ligne n°60 : language of identity. But since these can be restated without the
Ligne n°61 : language of identity they are not problems about identity. (For
...
Ligne n°60 : ... language of identity. But since these can be restated without the
- Ligne n°61 : language of identity they are not problems about identity. (For
- Ligne n°61 : language of identity they are not problems about identity. (For
Ligne n°62 : example, it is a puzzle, an aspect of the so-called “problem of
...
Ligne n°62 : ... example, it is a puzzle, an aspect of the so-called “problem of
- Ligne n°63 : personal identity”, whether the same person can have different bodies
Ligne n°64 : at different times. But this is just the puzzle whether a person can
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Ligne n°65 : ... have different bodies at different times. So since it can be stated
- Ligne n°66 : without the language of personal “identity”, it is not a problem about
Ligne n°67 : personal identity, but about personhood.) This article provides an
...
Ligne n°66 : ... without the language of personal “identity”, it is not a problem about
- Ligne n°67 : personal identity, but about personhood.) This article provides an
Ligne n°68 : overview of the topics indicated above, some assessment of the debates
...
Ligne n°70 : ... * 1. Introduction
- Ligne n°71 : * 2. The Logic of Identity
Ligne n°72 : * 3. Relative identity
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Ligne n°71 : ... * 2. The Logic of Identity
- Ligne n°72 : * 3. Relative identity
Ligne n°73 : * 4. Criteria of identity
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Ligne n°72 : ... * 3. Relative identity
- Ligne n°73 : * 4. Criteria of identity
Ligne n°74 : * 5. Identity over time
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Ligne n°73 : ... * 4. Criteria of identity
- Ligne n°74 : * 5. Identity over time
Ligne n°75 : * 6. Identity across possible worlds
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Ligne n°74 : ... * 5. Identity over time
- Ligne n°75 : * 6. Identity across possible worlds
Ligne n°76 : * 7. Contingent Identity
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Ligne n°75 : ... * 6. Identity across possible worlds
- Ligne n°76 : * 7. Contingent Identity
Ligne n°77 : * 8. Composition as Identity
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Ligne n°76 : ... * 7. Contingent Identity
- Ligne n°77 : * 8. Composition as Identity
Ligne n°78 : * 9. Vague identity
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Ligne n°77 : ... * 8. Composition as Identity
- Ligne n°78 : * 9. Vague identity
Ligne n°79 : * Bibliography
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Ligne n°87 : ... To say that things are identical is to say that they are the same.
- Ligne n°88 : “Identity” and “sameness” mean the same; their meanings are identical.
Ligne n°89 : However, they have more than one meaning. A distinction is customarily
...
Ligne n°89 : ... However, they have more than one meaning. A distinction is customarily
- Ligne n°90 : drawn between qualitative and numerical identity or sameness. Things
Ligne n°91 : with qualitative identity share properties, so things can be more or
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Ligne n°90 : ... drawn between qualitative and numerical identity or sameness. Things
- Ligne n°91 : with qualitative identity share properties, so things can be more or
Ligne n°92 : less qualitatively identical. Poodles and Great Danes are qualitatively
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Ligne n°94 : ... properties as go along with that, but two poodles will (very likely)
- Ligne n°95 : have greater qualitative identity. Numerical identity requires
- Ligne n°95 : have greater qualitative identity. Numerical identity requires
Ligne n°96 : absolute, or total, qualitative identity, and can only hold between a
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Ligne n°95 : ... have greater qualitative identity. Numerical identity requires
- Ligne n°96 : absolute, or total, qualitative identity, and can only hold between a
Ligne n°97 : thing and itself. Its name implies the controversial view that it is
...
Ligne n°97 : ... thing and itself. Its name implies the controversial view that it is
- Ligne n°98 : the only identity relation in accordance with which we can properly
Ligne n°99 : count (or number) things: x and y are to be properly counted as one
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- Ligne n°102 : Numerical identity is our topic. As noted, it is at the centre of
Ligne n°103 : several philosophical debates, but to many seems in itself wholly
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Ligne n°108 : ... could have the conceptual resources with which to explain the concept
- Ligne n°109 : of identity whilst lacking that concept itself. The basicness of the
Ligne n°110 : notion of identity in our conceptual scheme, and, in particular, the
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Ligne n°109 : ... of identity whilst lacking that concept itself. The basicness of the
- Ligne n°110 : notion of identity in our conceptual scheme, and, in particular, the
Ligne n°111 : link between identity and quantification has been particularly noted by
...
Ligne n°110 : ... notion of identity in our conceptual scheme, and, in particular, the
- Ligne n°111 : link between identity and quantification has been particularly noted by
Ligne n°112 : Quine (1964).
...
- Ligne n°114 : 2. The Logic of Identity
- Ligne n°116 : Numerical identity can be characterised, as just done, as the relation
Ligne n°117 : everything has to itself and to nothing else. But this is circular,
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Ligne n°126 : ... identical with y then everything true of x is true of y. Intuitively
- Ligne n°127 : this is right, but only picks out identity uniquely if “what is true of
Ligne n°128 : x” is understood to include “being identical with x”; otherwise it is
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Ligne n°129 : ... too weak. Circularity is thus not avoided. Nevertheless, Leibniz’s Law
- Ligne n°130 : appears to be crucial to our understanding of identity, and, more
Ligne n°131 : particularly, to our understanding of distinctness: we exhibit our
...
Ligne n°135 : ... of b, a is not identical with b), which some (in the context of the
- Ligne n°136 : discussion of vague identity) have questioned, but it appears as
Ligne n°137 : indispensable to our grip on the concept of identity as Leibniz’s Law
...
Ligne n°136 : ... discussion of vague identity) have questioned, but it appears as
- Ligne n°137 : indispensable to our grip on the concept of identity as Leibniz’s Law
Ligne n°138 : itself.
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- Ligne n°140 : The converse of Leibniz’s Law, the principle of the identity of
Ligne n°141 : indiscernibles, that if everything true of x is true of y, x is
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Ligne n°143 : ... understood to include “being identical with y” (as required if
- Ligne n°144 : Leibniz’s Law is to characterise identity uniquely among equivalence
Ligne n°145 : relations). But often it is read with “what is true of x” restricted,
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Ligne n°157 : ... “Phosphorus” contains ten, but Hesperus (the Evening Star) is
- Ligne n°158 : Phosphorus (the Morning Star). Again, despite the identity, it is
Ligne n°159 : informative to be told that Hesperus is Phosphorus, but not to be told
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Ligne n°169 : ... of “‘Phosphorus’ contains ten letters”. Thus the names do not have the
- Ligne n°170 : same referents in the identity statement and the predications. In the
Ligne n°171 : Giorgione/Barbarelli example this seems less plausible. Here the
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- Ligne n°191 : The view of identity just put forward (henceforth “the classical view”)
Ligne n°192 : characterises it as the equivalence relation which everything has to
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Ligne n°196 : ... truth-functional connectives, any two predicates which can be regarded
- Ligne n°197 : as expressing identity (i.e., any predicates satisfying the two
Ligne n°198 : schemata “for all x, Rxx” and “for all x, for all y, Rxy → (Fx → Fy)”
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Ligne n°200 : ... equivalent. They do not, however, ensure that any two-place predicate
- Ligne n°201 : does express identity within a particular theory, for it may simply be
Ligne n°202 : that the descriptive resources of the theory are insufficiently rich to
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Ligne n°203 : ... distinguish items between which the equivalence relation expressed by
- Ligne n°204 : the predicate holds (“Identity” in Geach 1972).
Ligne n°209 : ... I-predicate. If so it will not, and did not even in the poorer theory,
- Ligne n°210 : express identity. For example, “having the same income as” will be an
Ligne n°211 : I-predicate in a theory in which persons with the same income are
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Ligne n°217 : ... reinterpret the sentences of the theory so that the I-predicate in the
- Ligne n°218 : newly interpreted theory does express identity. Every sentence will
Ligne n°219 : have just the same truth-conditions under the new interpretation and
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Ligne n°224 : ... so that the predicate which previously expressed having the same income
- Ligne n°225 : comes now to express identity. The universe of discourse now consists
Ligne n°226 : of income groups, not people. The extensions of the monadic predicates
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Ligne n°235 : ... that is an I-predicate in the theory to which it belongs expresses
- Ligne n°236 : identity. In fact, no condition can be stated in a first-order language
Ligne n°237 : for a predicate to express identity, rather than mere indiscernibility
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Ligne n°236 : ... identity. In fact, no condition can be stated in a first-order language
- Ligne n°237 : for a predicate to express identity, rather than mere indiscernibility
Ligne n°238 : by the resources of the language. However, in a second-order language,
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Ligne n°240 : ... the language contains predicates) is possible and Leibniz’s Law is
- Ligne n°241 : therefore statable, identity can be uniquely characterised. Identity is
- Ligne n°241 : therefore statable, identity can be uniquely characterised. Identity is
Ligne n°242 : thus not first-order, but only second-order definable.
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- Ligne n°244 : 3. Relative Identity
Ligne n°246 : ... This situation provides the basis for Geach’s radical contention that
- Ligne n°247 : the notion of absolute identity has no application and that there is
Ligne n°248 : only relative identity. This section contains a brief discussion of
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Ligne n°247 : ... the notion of absolute identity has no application and that there is
- Ligne n°248 : only relative identity. This section contains a brief discussion of
Ligne n°249 : Geach’s complex view. (For more details see the entry on relative
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Ligne n°249 : ... Geach’s complex view. (For more details see the entry on relative
- Ligne n°250 : identity, Deutsch 1997, Dummett 1981 and 1991, Hawthorne 2003 and
Ligne n°251 : Noonan 2017.) Geach maintains that since no criterion can be given by
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Ligne n°254 : ... it belongs, but also absolute indiscernibility, we should jettison the
- Ligne n°255 : classical notion of identity (1991). He dismisses the possibility of
Ligne n°256 : defining identity in a second-order language on the ground of the
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Ligne n°255 : ... classical notion of identity (1991). He dismisses the possibility of
- Ligne n°256 : defining identity in a second-order language on the ground of the
Ligne n°257 : paradoxical nature of unrestricted quantification over properties and
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Ligne n°259 : ... first-order theory may always be interpreted as expressing absolute
- Ligne n°260 : identity (even if such an interpretation is not required). Geach
Ligne n°261 : objects that Quine’s suggestion leads to a “Baroque Meinongian
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Ligne n°262 : ... ontology” and is inconsistent with Quine’s own expressed preference for
- Ligne n°263 : “desert landscapes” (“Identity” in Geach 1972: 245).
Ligne n°269 : ... and either x or y, but not holding between x and y. If an equivalence
- Ligne n°270 : relation is not absolute it is relative. Classical identity is an
Ligne n°271 : absolute equivalence relation. Geach’s main contention is that any
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Ligne n°273 : ... language will have the null class as its extension, and so there can be
- Ligne n°274 : no expression for classical identity in any possible language. This is
Ligne n°275 : the thesis he argues against Quine.
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- Ligne n°277 : Geach also maintains the sortal relativity of identity statements, that
Ligne n°278 : “x is the same A as y” does not “split up” into “x is an A and y is an
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Ligne n°283 : ... satisfied by a pair only if the I-predicate of L is satisfied by
- Ligne n°284 : . Geach’s thesis of the sortal relativity of identity thus neither
Ligne n°285 : entails nor is entailed by his thesis of the inexpressibility of
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Ligne n°285 : ... entails nor is entailed by his thesis of the inexpressibility of
- Ligne n°286 : identity. It is the sortal relativity thesis that is the central issue
Ligne n°287 : between Geach and Wiggins (1967 and 1980). It entails that a relation
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Ligne n°296 : ... suggestion to interpret a language in which some expression is an
- Ligne n°297 : I-predicate so that the I-predicate expresses classical identity sins
Ligne n°298 : against a highly intuitive methodological programme enunciated by Quine
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Ligne n°310 : ... for each L[n], those entities for which the I-predicate of L[n] (E[n])
- Ligne n°311 : gives a criterion of absolute identity. This will be so because any
Ligne n°312 : sentence of L will retain its truth conditions in any L[n] to which it
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Ligne n°335 : ... the existence of what he calls “absolute surmen” (entities for which
- Ligne n°336 : having the same surname constitutes a criterion of absolute identity,
Ligne n°337 : ie., entails indiscernibility in all respects). Because Geach is now
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Ligne n°385 : ... into an absurdity.” It thus seems that his argument for the
- Ligne n°386 : non-existence of absolute identity fails.
Ligne n°388 : ... Geach’s argument for his second thesis, that of the sortal relativity
- Ligne n°389 : of identity, is that it provides the best solution to a variety of well
Ligne n°390 : known puzzles about identity and counting at a time and over time. The
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Ligne n°389 : ... of identity, is that it provides the best solution to a variety of well
- Ligne n°390 : known puzzles about identity and counting at a time and over time. The
Ligne n°391 : most well known puzzle is that of the cat on the mat, which comes in
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Ligne n°407 : ... cat on the mat. So they cannot be distinct cats. They must be the same
- Ligne n°408 : cat, even though they are distinct individuals; and so identity under
Ligne n°409 : the sortal concept cat must be a relative identity relation.
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Ligne n°408 : ... cat, even though they are distinct individuals; and so identity under
- Ligne n°409 : the sortal concept cat must be a relative identity relation.
Ligne n°436 : ... 1980). Again, it can be accepted that both Tib and Tibbles are cats,
- Ligne n°437 : but deny that in counting them as one we are counting by identity,
Ligne n°438 : rather, we are counting by “almost identity” (Lewis 1993). Another
...
Ligne n°437 : ... but deny that in counting them as one we are counting by identity,
- Ligne n°438 : rather, we are counting by “almost identity” (Lewis 1993). Another
Ligne n°439 : possibility is to accept that both Tib and Tibbles are cats, but deny
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- Ligne n°453 : 4. Criteria of identity
Ligne n°455 : ... A notion that Geach deploys extensively, and which is also in common
- Ligne n°456 : use by his opponents, is that of a criterion of identity, a standard by
Ligne n°457 : which identity is to be judged. This section will attempt to untangle
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Ligne n°456 : ... use by his opponents, is that of a criterion of identity, a standard by
- Ligne n°457 : which identity is to be judged. This section will attempt to untangle
Ligne n°458 : some of the complexities this notion involves.
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- Ligne n°460 : The notion of a criterion of identity was introduced into philosophical
Ligne n°461 : terminology by Frege (1884) and strongly emphasised by Wittgenstein
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Ligne n°467 : ... unitary one. In the case of abstract objects (the case discussed by
- Ligne n°468 : Frege) the criterion of identity for Fs is thought of as an equivalence
Ligne n°469 : relation holding between objects distinct from Fs. Thus the criterion
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Ligne n°469 : ... relation holding between objects distinct from Fs. Thus the criterion
- Ligne n°470 : of identity for directions is parallelism of lines, that is, the
Ligne n°471 : direction of line a is identical with the direction of line b if and
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Ligne n°471 : ... direction of line a is identical with the direction of line b if and
- Ligne n°472 : only if line a is parallel to line b. The criterion of identity for
Ligne n°473 : numbers is equinumerosity of concepts, that is, the number of As is
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Ligne n°474 : ... identical with the number of Bs if and only if there are exactly as
- Ligne n°475 : many As as Bs. The relation between the criterion of identity for Fs
Ligne n°476 : and the criterion of application for the concept F (the standard for
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Ligne n°478 : ... (Wright and Hale 2001) to be that to be an F is just to be something
- Ligne n°479 : for which questions of identity and distinctness are to settled by
Ligne n°480 : appeal to the criterion of identity for Fs. (Thus, when Frege went on
...
Ligne n°479 : ... for which questions of identity and distinctness are to settled by
- Ligne n°480 : appeal to the criterion of identity for Fs. (Thus, when Frege went on
Ligne n°481 : to give an explicit definition of numbers as extensions of concepts he
...
Ligne n°482 : ... appealed to it only to deduce what has come to be called Hume’s
- Ligne n°483 : Principle – his statement of his criterion of identity for numbers in
Ligne n°484 : terms of equinumerosity of concepts, and emphasised that he regarded
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Ligne n°486 : ... objects, however, things seem to stand differently. Often the criterion
- Ligne n°487 : of identity for a concrete object of type F is said to be a relation R
Ligne n°488 : such that for any Fs, x and y, x=y if and only if Rxy. In this case the
...
Ligne n°488 : ... such that for any Fs, x and y, x=y if and only if Rxy. In this case the
- Ligne n°489 : criterion of identity for Fs is not stated as a relation between
Ligne n°490 : entities distinct from Fs and the criterion of identity cannot
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Ligne n°489 : ... criterion of identity for Fs is not stated as a relation between
- Ligne n°490 : entities distinct from Fs and the criterion of identity cannot
Ligne n°491 : plausibly be thought of as determining the criterion of application.
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Ligne n°492 : ... Another example of the lack of uniformity in the notion of a criterion
- Ligne n°493 : of identity in contemporary philosophy is, in the case of concrete
Ligne n°494 : objects, a distinction customarily made between a criterion of
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Ligne n°494 : ... objects, a distinction customarily made between a criterion of
- Ligne n°495 : diachronic identity and a criterion of synchronic identity; the former
- Ligne n°495 : diachronic identity and a criterion of synchronic identity; the former
Ligne n°496 : taking the form “x is at t the same F as y is at t′ if and only if…”,
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Ligne n°498 : ... between objects x and y and times t and t′. (In the case of persons,
- Ligne n°499 : for example, a candidate criterion of diachronic identity is: x is at t
Ligne n°500 : the same person as y is at t′ if and only if x at t is psychologically
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Ligne n°500 : ... the same person as y is at t′ if and only if x at t is psychologically
- Ligne n°501 : continuous with y at t′.) A criterion of synchronic identity, by
Ligne n°502 : contrast, will typically specify how the parts of an F-thing existing
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- Ligne n°506 : One way of bringing system into the discussion of criteria of identity
Ligne n°507 : is to make use of the distinction between one-level and two-level
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Ligne n°507 : ... is to make use of the distinction between one-level and two-level
- Ligne n°508 : criteria of identity (Williamson 1990, Lowe 2012). The Fregean criteria
Ligne n°509 : of identity for directions and numbers are two-level. The objects for
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Ligne n°508 : ... criteria of identity (Williamson 1990, Lowe 2012). The Fregean criteria
- Ligne n°509 : of identity for directions and numbers are two-level. The objects for
Ligne n°510 : which the criterion is given are distinct from, and can be pictured as
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- Ligne n°521 : A two-level criterion of identity is thus in the first place an
Ligne n°522 : impliicit definition of a function “d( )” (e.g., “the direction of”) in
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Ligne n°524 : ... direction” can be defined as “is the direction of some line”).
- Ligne n°525 : Consistently with the two-level criterion of identity stated several
Ligne n°526 : distinct functions may be the reference of the functor “d”. Hence, as
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Ligne n°526 : ... distinct functions may be the reference of the functor “d”. Hence, as
- Ligne n°527 : emphasised by Lowe (1997: section 6), two-level criteria of identity
Ligne n°528 : are neither definitions of identity, nor of identity restricted to a
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Ligne n°527 : ... emphasised by Lowe (1997: section 6), two-level criteria of identity
- Ligne n°528 : are neither definitions of identity, nor of identity restricted to a
- Ligne n°528 : are neither definitions of identity, nor of identity restricted to a
Ligne n°529 : certain sort (for identity is universal), nor even of the sortal terms
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Ligne n°528 : ... are neither definitions of identity, nor of identity restricted to a
- Ligne n°529 : certain sort (for identity is universal), nor even of the sortal terms
Ligne n°530 : denoting the sorts for which they provide criteria. They merely
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- Ligne n°536 : On the other hand, the criterion of identity for sets given by the
Ligne n°537 : Axiom of Extensionality (sets are the same iff they have the same
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Ligne n°537 : ... Axiom of Extensionality (sets are the same iff they have the same
- Ligne n°538 : members), unlike the criterion of identity for numbers given by Hume’s
Ligne n°539 : Principle, and Davidson’s criterion of event identity (events are the
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Ligne n°538 : ... members), unlike the criterion of identity for numbers given by Hume’s
- Ligne n°539 : Principle, and Davidson’s criterion of event identity (events are the
Ligne n°540 : same iff they have the same causes and effects (“The Individuation of
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Ligne n°541 : ... Events” in his 1980)) are one-level: the objects for which the
- Ligne n°542 : criterion of identity is stated are the same as those between which the
Ligne n°543 : criterial relation obtains. In general, a one-level criterion for
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- Ligne n°548 : Not all criteria of identity can be two-level (on pain of infinite
Ligne n°549 : regress), and it is tempting to think that the distinction between
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Ligne n°556 : ... possible. In fact, it can be applied to any type of object K, such that
- Ligne n°557 : the criterion of identity for Ks can be thought of as an equivalence
Ligne n°558 : relation between a distinct type of object, K*s, but some such objects
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Ligne n°563 : ... (instantaneous) temporal parts (see discussion below), the problem of
- Ligne n°564 : supplying a diachronic criterion of identity for persisting concrete
Ligne n°565 : objects can be regarded as the problem of providing a two-level
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Ligne n°568 : ... (Though some can. For example, it is quite plausible that the criterion
- Ligne n°569 : of identity over time for persons should be thought of as given by a
Ligne n°570 : relation between bodies.)
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Ligne n°578 : ... criterion. A way of unifying the various different ways of talking of
- Ligne n°579 : criteria of identity is thus to take as the paradigmatic form of a
Ligne n°580 : statement of a criterion of identity a statement of the form: for any
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Ligne n°579 : ... criteria of identity is thus to take as the paradigmatic form of a
- Ligne n°580 : statement of a criterion of identity a statement of the form: for any
Ligne n°581 : x, for any y, if x is an F and y is an F then x=y if and only if Rxy
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Ligne n°584 : ... If the notion is interpreted in this way then the relation between the
- Ligne n°585 : criterion of identity and the criterion of application will be that of
Ligne n°586 : one-way determination. The criterion of identity will be determined by,
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Ligne n°585 : ... criterion of identity and the criterion of application will be that of
- Ligne n°586 : one-way determination. The criterion of identity will be determined by,
Ligne n°587 : but not determine, the criterion of application.
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- Ligne n°589 : For, in general, a one-level criterion of identity for Fs as explained
Ligne n°590 : above is equivalent to the conjunction of:
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Ligne n°603 : ... “R-related” to it. By its form this states a merely necessary conditon
- Ligne n°604 : for being a thing of sort “F”. The one-level criterion of identity thus
Ligne n°605 : again merely specifies a necessary condition of being an object of sort
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Ligne n°609 : ... laid down, no further stipulation is required of a criterion of
- Ligne n°610 : “F”-identity, whether one-level or two-level.
Ligne n°612 : ... This conclusion is, of course, in agreement with Lewis’s view that
- Ligne n°613 : there are no genuine problems about identity as such (Lewis 1986, Ch.
Ligne n°614 : 4), but it is in tension with the thought that sortal concepts, as
...
Ligne n°615 : ... distinct from adjectival concepts, are to be characterised by their
- Ligne n°616 : involvement of criteria of identity as well as criteria of application.
- Ligne n°618 : A conception of identity criteria which allows this characterisation of
Ligne n°619 : the notion of a sortal concept, and which has so far not been
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Ligne n°620 : ... mentioned, is that of Dummett (1981). Dummett denies that a criterion
- Ligne n°621 : of identity must always be regarded as a criterion of identity for a
- Ligne n°621 : of identity must always be regarded as a criterion of identity for a
Ligne n°622 : type of object. There is a basic level, he suggests, at which what a
...
Ligne n°622 : ... type of object. There is a basic level, he suggests, at which what a
- Ligne n°623 : criterion of identity is a criterion of, is the truth of a statement in
Ligne n°624 : which no objects are referred to. Such a statement can be expressed
...
Ligne n°638 : ... Adjectival terms, which have only a criterion of application and no
- Ligne n°639 : criterion of identity, are ones which have a use in such crude
Ligne n°640 : predications, but no use in statements of identification. Sortal terms,
...
Ligne n°641 : ... as just noted, have a use in both contexts, and sortal terms may share
- Ligne n°642 : their criteria of application but differ in their criteria of identity
Ligne n°643 : since grasp of the truth-conditions of the crude predication “This is
...
Ligne n°649 : ... On Dummett’s account, then, it may be possible to accept that whenever
- Ligne n°650 : a criterion of identity for a type of object is to be given it must be
Ligne n°651 : (expressible as) a two-level criterion, which implicity defines a
...
- Ligne n°657 : 5. Identity over time
Ligne n°659 : ... As noted in the last section, another source of apparent disunity in
- Ligne n°660 : the concept of a criterion of identity is the distinction made between
Ligne n°661 : synchronic criteria of identity and diachronic criteria of identity.
...
Ligne n°660 : ... the concept of a criterion of identity is the distinction made between
- Ligne n°661 : synchronic criteria of identity and diachronic criteria of identity.
- Ligne n°661 : synchronic criteria of identity and diachronic criteria of identity.
Ligne n°662 : Criteria of identity can be employed synchronically, as in the examples
...
Ligne n°661 : ... synchronic criteria of identity and diachronic criteria of identity.
- Ligne n°662 : Criteria of identity can be employed synchronically, as in the examples
Ligne n°663 : just given, to determine whether two coexistent objects are parts of
...
Ligne n°663 : ... just given, to determine whether two coexistent objects are parts of
- Ligne n°664 : the same object of a sort, or diachronically, to determine identity
Ligne n°665 : over time. But as Lowe notes (2012: 137), it is an error to suppose
...
Ligne n°665 : ... over time. But as Lowe notes (2012: 137), it is an error to suppose
- Ligne n°666 : that diachronic identity and synchronic identity are different kinds of
- Ligne n°666 : that diachronic identity and synchronic identity are different kinds of
Ligne n°667 : identity and so demand different kinds of identity criteria. What then
...
Ligne n°666 : ... that diachronic identity and synchronic identity are different kinds of
- Ligne n°667 : identity and so demand different kinds of identity criteria. What then
- Ligne n°667 : identity and so demand different kinds of identity criteria. What then
Ligne n°668 : is a criterion of identity over time?
...
Ligne n°667 : ... identity and so demand different kinds of identity criteria. What then
- Ligne n°668 : is a criterion of identity over time?
- Ligne n°670 : Identity over time is itself a controversial notion, however, because
Ligne n°671 : time involves change. Heraclitus argued that one could not bathe in the
...
Ligne n°672 : ... same river twice because new waters were ever flowing in. Hume argued
- Ligne n°673 : that identity over time was a fiction we substitute for a collection of
Ligne n°674 : related objects. Such views can be seen as based on a misunderstanding
...
Ligne n°680 : ... remains true of it. But the question remains how to characterise
- Ligne n°681 : identity through time and across change given that there is such a
Ligne n°682 : thing.
...
Ligne n°688 : ... problems and associated issues about “best candidate” or “no rival
- Ligne n°689 : candidate” accounts of identity over time, and the debate over Humean
Ligne n°690 : supervenience – see articles on relative identity, personal identity,
...
Ligne n°689 : ... candidate” accounts of identity over time, and the debate over Humean
- Ligne n°690 : supervenience – see articles on relative identity, personal identity,
- Ligne n°690 : supervenience – see articles on relative identity, personal identity,
Ligne n°691 : Hawley 2001 and Sider 2001.)
...
Ligne n°754 : ... same cat, so that counting cats is not always counting in accordance
- Ligne n°755 : with absolute identity.
Ligne n°777 : ... This argument illustrates the interdependence of the various topics
- Ligne n°778 : discussed under the rubric of identity. Whether it is valid, of course,
Ligne n°779 : depends on the correct analysis of modal predication, and, in
...
Ligne n°779 : ... depends on the correct analysis of modal predication, and, in
- Ligne n°780 : particular, on whether it should be analysed in terms of “identity
Ligne n°781 : across possible worlds” or in terms of Lewisean counterpart theory.
...
- Ligne n°784 : 6. Identity across possible worlds
Ligne n°786 : ... In the interpretation of modal discourse recourse is often made to the
- Ligne n°787 : idea of “identity across possible worlds”. If modal discourse is
Ligne n°788 : interpreted in this way it becomes natural to regard a statement
...
Ligne n°788 : ... interpreted in this way it becomes natural to regard a statement
- Ligne n°789 : ascribing a modal property to an individual as asserting the identity
Ligne n°790 : of that individual across worlds: “John might have been a millionaire”,
...
Ligne n°811 : ... identical with the one in the neighbouring world, but not identical
- Ligne n°812 : with the corresponding bicycle in distant worlds, since identity is
Ligne n°813 : transitive. Hence it seems one must either adopt an extreme
...
Ligne n°815 : ... possible for an individual, or reject the interpretation of de re modal
- Ligne n°816 : discourse as asserting identity across possible worlds.
- Ligne n°818 : This and other problems with cross-world identity suggest that some
Ligne n°819 : other weaker relation, of similarity or what David Lewis calls
...
Ligne n°830 : ... to understanding modal discourse, however, but also to getting to the
- Ligne n°831 : correct account of identity over time. For, as we saw, the argument
Ligne n°832 : against perdurance theory outlined at the end of the last section
...
- Ligne n°853 : Counterpart theory is also significant to the topic of identity over
Ligne n°854 : time in another way, since it provides the analogy to which the stage
...
Ligne n°863 : ... only the existence of a past time at which a (temporal) counterpart of
- Ligne n°864 : me was fat. The problem of identity over time for things of a kind, for
Ligne n°865 : stage theorists, is just the problem of characterizing the appropriate
...
Ligne n°868 : ... For a more detailed discussion of the topic, see the entry transworld
- Ligne n°869 : identity. Whether de re modal discourse is to be interpreted in terms
Ligne n°870 : of identity across possible worlds or counterpart theoretically (or in
...
Ligne n°869 : ... identity. Whether de re modal discourse is to be interpreted in terms
- Ligne n°870 : of identity across possible worlds or counterpart theoretically (or in
Ligne n°871 : some other way entirely) is also relevant to our next topic, that of
...
Ligne n°871 : ... some other way entirely) is also relevant to our next topic, that of
- Ligne n°872 : contingent identity.
- Ligne n°874 : 7. Contingent identity
Ligne n°876 : ... Before Kripke’s writings (1972 [1980]), it seemed a platitude that
- Ligne n°877 : statements of identity could be contingent – when they contained two
Ligne n°878 : terms differing in sense but identical in reference and so were not
...
Ligne n°879 : ... analytic. Kripke challenged this platitude, though, of course, he did
- Ligne n°880 : not reject the possibility of contingent statements of identity. But he
Ligne n°881 : argued that when the terms flanking the sign of identity were what he
...
Ligne n°880 : ... not reject the possibility of contingent statements of identity. But he
- Ligne n°881 : argued that when the terms flanking the sign of identity were what he
Ligne n°882 : called rigid designators, an identity statement, if true at all, had to
...
Ligne n°881 : ... argued that when the terms flanking the sign of identity were what he
- Ligne n°882 : called rigid designators, an identity statement, if true at all, had to
Ligne n°883 : be necessarily true, but need not be knowable a priori, as an analytic
...
Ligne n°883 : ... be necessarily true, but need not be knowable a priori, as an analytic
- Ligne n°884 : truth would be. Connectedly, Kripke argued that identity and
Ligne n°885 : distinctness were themselves necessary relations: if an object is
...
Ligne n°889 : ... Kripke’s arguments were very persuasive, but there are examples that
- Ligne n°890 : suggest that his conclusion is too sweeping – that even identity
Ligne n°891 : statements containing rigid designators can be, in a sense, contingent.
...
Ligne n°891 : ... statements containing rigid designators can be, in a sense, contingent.
- Ligne n°892 : The debate over contingent identity is concerned with the assessment
Ligne n°893 : and proper analysis of these examples.
...
Ligne n°900 : ... Lumpl would have continued to exist. The two would have been distinct.
- Ligne n°901 : Thus it seems that the identity of Lumpl and Goliath, if admitted, must
Ligne n°902 : be acknowledged as merely contingent.
...
Ligne n°910 : ... seems highly implausible, which provides the strength of the argument
- Ligne n°911 : for contingent identity. Another way of thinking of this matter is in
Ligne n°912 : terms of the failure of the supervenience of the macroscopic on the
...
Ligne n°923 : ... David Lewis (in “Counterparts of Persons and their Bodies”, 1971)
- Ligne n°924 : suggests that the identity of a person with his body (assuming the
Ligne n°925 : person and the body, like Goliath and Lumpl, are at all times
...
Ligne n°927 : ... He appeals to counterpart theory, modified to allow a variety of
- Ligne n°928 : counterpart relations, to explain this. Contingent identity then makes
Ligne n°929 : sense, since “I and my body might not have been identical” now
...
- Ligne n°934 : What is crucial to making sense of contingent identity is an acceptance
Ligne n°935 : that modal predicates are inconstant in denotation (that is, stand for
...
Ligne n°939 : ... (Gibbard 1975, Noonan 1991, 1993). However, whether the examples of
- Ligne n°940 : contingent identity in the literature are persuasive enough to make it
Ligne n°941 : reasonable to accept the certainly initially surprising idea that modal
...
Ligne n°946 : ... interdependence of the topics under discussion: only if the possibility
- Ligne n°947 : of contingent identity is secured, by counterpart theory or some other
Ligne n°948 : account of de re modality which does not straightforwardly analyse de
...
Ligne n°948 : ... account of de re modality which does not straightforwardly analyse de
- Ligne n°949 : re modal predication in terms of identity across possible worlds, can
Ligne n°950 : perdurance theory (or stage theory) as an account of identity across
...
Ligne n°949 : ... re modal predication in terms of identity across possible worlds, can
- Ligne n°950 : perdurance theory (or stage theory) as an account of identity across
Ligne n°951 : time be sustained against the modal arguments of Wiggins, Thomson and
...
- Ligne n°954 : 8. Composition as Identity
Ligne n°957 : ... attention in the contemporary literature is the “Composition as
- Ligne n°958 : Identity” thesis. The thesis comes in a weak and a strong form. In its
Ligne n°959 : weak form the thesis is that the mereological composition relation is
...
Ligne n°959 : ... weak form the thesis is that the mereological composition relation is
- Ligne n°960 : analogous in a number of important ways to the identity relation and so
Ligne n°961 : deserves to be called a kind of identity. In its strong form the thesis
...
Ligne n°960 : ... analogous in a number of important ways to the identity relation and so
- Ligne n°961 : deserves to be called a kind of identity. In its strong form the thesis
Ligne n°962 : is that the composition relation is strictly identical with the
...
Ligne n°962 : ... is that the composition relation is strictly identical with the
- Ligne n°963 : identity relation, viz. that the parts of a whole are literally
Ligne n°964 : (collectively) identical with the whole itself. The strong thesis was
...
Ligne n°974 : ... and its parts (a whole is “nothing over and above” its parts),
- Ligne n°975 : buttressed by claims that identity and composition are alike in various
Ligne n°976 : ways. Lewis (1991: 85) makes five likeness claims:
...
Ligne n°1024 : ... If one believes Lewis’s likeness claims one will be tempted by at least
- Ligne n°1025 : the weak Composition as Identity thesis. If composition is a type of
Ligne n°1026 : identity this gives some kind of explanation of why the parallels
...
Ligne n°1025 : ... the weak Composition as Identity thesis. If composition is a type of
- Ligne n°1026 : identity this gives some kind of explanation of why the parallels
Ligne n°1027 : between the two hold. But the strong thesis, that the composition
...
Ligne n°1027 : ... between the two hold. But the strong thesis, that the composition
- Ligne n°1028 : relation is the identity relation, gives a fuller explanation. So why
Ligne n°1029 : not hold the strong thesis? Because, many think, there are additional
...
- Ligne n°1032 : The classical identity relation is one that can only have single
Ligne n°1033 : objects as relata (as in: “George Orwell = Eric Blair”). If we adopt a
...
Ligne n°1034 : ... language that allows the formation of plural terms we can
- Ligne n°1035 : unproblematically define a plural identity relation that holds between
Ligne n°1036 : pluralities of objects too. Plural identity statements such as “the
...
Ligne n°1035 : ... unproblematically define a plural identity relation that holds between
- Ligne n°1036 : pluralities of objects too. Plural identity statements such as “the
Ligne n°1037 : hunters are identical with the gatherers” are understood to mean that
...
Ligne n°1038 : ... for all x, x is one of the hunters iff x is one of the gatherers. But,
- Ligne n°1039 : according to the strong Composition as Identity thesis, there can also
Ligne n°1040 : be true hybrid identity statements that relate pluralities and single
...
Ligne n°1039 : ... according to the strong Composition as Identity thesis, there can also
- Ligne n°1040 : be true hybrid identity statements that relate pluralities and single
Ligne n°1041 : objects. That is, sentences such as “the bricks = the wall” are taken
...
Ligne n°1041 : ... objects. That is, sentences such as “the bricks = the wall” are taken
- Ligne n°1042 : by the defender of strong Composition as Identity to be well-formed
Ligne n°1043 : sentences that express strict identities.
...
Ligne n°1045 : ... The first challenge facing the defender of the strong thesis is the
- Ligne n°1046 : least troublesome. It is the syntactic problem that hybrid identity
Ligne n°1047 : statements are ungrammatical in English (Van Inwagen, 1994: 211).
...
Ligne n°1050 : ... bricks are identical with the wall” is not. However, there is in fact
- Ligne n°1051 : some doubt about whether hybrid identity statements are ungrammatical
Ligne n°1052 : in English, and some have pointed out that this is anyway a mere
...
Ligne n°1057 : ... be made in which to express the claims made by the defender of the
- Ligne n°1058 : strong Composition as Identity thesis. (Sider 2007, Cotnoir 2013) (NB
Ligne n°1059 : The claims regarding Norwegian and Hungarian are to be found in these
...
Ligne n°1062 : ... The second challenge is more troublesome. It is the semantic problem of
- Ligne n°1063 : providing coherent truth-conditions for hybrid identity statements. The
Ligne n°1064 : standard way to provide the truth-conditions for the classical identity
...
Ligne n°1063 : ... providing coherent truth-conditions for hybrid identity statements. The
- Ligne n°1064 : standard way to provide the truth-conditions for the classical identity
Ligne n°1065 : relation is to say that an identity statement of the form “a=b” is true
...
Ligne n°1064 : ... standard way to provide the truth-conditions for the classical identity
- Ligne n°1065 : relation is to say that an identity statement of the form “a=b” is true
Ligne n°1066 : iff “a” and “b” have the same referents. But this account clearly does
...
Ligne n°1066 : ... iff “a” and “b” have the same referents. But this account clearly does
- Ligne n°1067 : not work for hybrid identity statements, for there is no (single)
Ligne n°1068 : referent for a plural term. Moreover, the standard way of giving the
...
Ligne n°1068 : ... referent for a plural term. Moreover, the standard way of giving the
- Ligne n°1069 : truth-conditions for plural identity statements (mentioned above) does
Ligne n°1070 : not work for hybrid identity statements either. To say that “x is one
...
Ligne n°1069 : ... truth-conditions for plural identity statements (mentioned above) does
- Ligne n°1070 : not work for hybrid identity statements either. To say that “x is one
Ligne n°1071 : of the ys” is to say that x is (classically) identical with one of the
...
Ligne n°1078 : ... noted that Leibniz’s Law (and its contrapositive) appear to be crucial
- Ligne n°1079 : to our understanding of identity and distinctness. But it seems that
Ligne n°1080 : the defender of strong Composition as Identity must deny this. After
...
Ligne n°1079 : ... to our understanding of identity and distinctness. But it seems that
- Ligne n°1080 : the defender of strong Composition as Identity must deny this. After
Ligne n°1081 : all, the bricks are many, but the wall is one. The onus is thus on the
...
Ligne n°1081 : ... all, the bricks are many, but the wall is one. The onus is thus on the
- Ligne n°1082 : defender of strong Composition as Identity to explain why we should
Ligne n°1083 : think the “are” in hybrid identity statements really expresses the
...
Ligne n°1082 : ... defender of strong Composition as Identity to explain why we should
- Ligne n°1083 : think the “are” in hybrid identity statements really expresses the
Ligne n°1084 : relation of identity.
...
Ligne n°1083 : ... think the “are” in hybrid identity statements really expresses the
- Ligne n°1084 : relation of identity.
Ligne n°1087 : ... insurmountable (Lewis, for example, rejects strong Composition as
- Ligne n°1088 : Identity on the basis of them). But, in recent semantic work in this
Ligne n°1089 : area, accounts have emerged that promise to answer both challenges.
...
- Ligne n°1093 : 9. Vague identity
- Ligne n°1095 : Like the impossibility of contingent identity, the impossibility of
Ligne n°1096 : vague identity appears to be a straightforward consequence of the
...
Ligne n°1095 : ... Like the impossibility of contingent identity, the impossibility of
- Ligne n°1096 : vague identity appears to be a straightforward consequence of the
Ligne n°1097 : classical concept of identity (Evans 1978, see also Salmon 1982). For
...
Ligne n°1096 : ... vague identity appears to be a straightforward consequence of the
- Ligne n°1097 : classical concept of identity (Evans 1978, see also Salmon 1982). For
Ligne n°1098 : if a is only vaguely identical with b, something is true of it – that
...
Ligne n°1100 : ... Leibniz’s Law, it is not identical with b at all. Of course, there are
- Ligne n°1101 : vague statements of identity – “Princeton is Princeton Borough” (Lewis
Ligne n°1102 : 1988) – but the conclusion appears to follow that such vagueness is
...
Ligne n°1103 : ... only possible when one or both of the terms flanking the sign of
- Ligne n°1104 : identity is an imprecise designator. Relatedly, it appears to follow
Ligne n°1105 : that identity itself must be a determinate relation.
...
Ligne n°1104 : ... identity is an imprecise designator. Relatedly, it appears to follow
- Ligne n°1105 : that identity itself must be a determinate relation.
Ligne n°1107 : ... But some examples suggest that this conclusion is too sweeping – that
- Ligne n°1108 : even identity statements containing precise designators may be, in some
Ligne n°1109 : sense, indeterminate. Consider Everest and some precisely defined hunk
...
Ligne n°1123 : ... Inwagen’s (1990) fiendish cabinet which disrupts whatever features are
- Ligne n°1124 : relevant to personal identity, and the second of whom then steps out:
Ligne n°1138 : ... This argument differs from the standard version of Evans’s argument by
- Ligne n°1139 : not depending upon identity-involving properties (e.g. being such that
Ligne n°1140 : it is indeterminate whether she is Omega) to establish distinctness,
...
- Ligne n°1144 : The debate over vague identity is too vast to survey here, but to
Ligne n°1145 : finish we can relate this debate to the previously discussed debate
...
Ligne n°1145 : ... finish we can relate this debate to the previously discussed debate
- Ligne n°1146 : about identity over time.
- Ligne n°1148 : For some putative cases of vagueness in synchronic identity it seems
Ligne n°1149 : reasonable to accept the conclusion of Evans’s argument and locate the
...
Ligne n°1153 : ... is located in Alpha Hall, Jones in Beta Hall. The nature of the
- Ligne n°1154 : structure is such that the identity statement “The building in which
Ligne n°1155 : Smith is located is the building in which Jones is located” is neither
...
- Ligne n°1164 : Perdurance theorists, who assimilate identity over time to identity
- Ligne n°1164 : Perdurance theorists, who assimilate identity over time to identity
Ligne n°1165 : over space, can accommodate vagueness in identity over time in the same
...
Ligne n°1164 : ... Perdurance theorists, who assimilate identity over time to identity
- Ligne n°1165 : over space, can accommodate vagueness in identity over time in the same
Ligne n°1166 : way. In Hawley’s example they can say that there are several entities
...
Ligne n°1166 : ... way. In Hawley’s example they can say that there are several entities
- Ligne n°1167 : present: one that exists before and after the identity-obscuring
Ligne n°1168 : occurrences in the cabinet, one that exists only before, and one that
...
Ligne n°1188 : ... entities which are not complex; he may insist that any change destroys
- Ligne n°1189 : identity so that in a strict and philosophical sense Alpha is distinct
Ligne n°1190 : from Omega; or he may reject the case as one of vagueness, insisting
...
Ligne n°1196 : ... vagueness, deny the multiplicity of entities embraced by the perdurance
- Ligne n°1197 : theorist and reject Evans’s argument against vague identity.
Ligne n°1203 : ... Whilst locating it in the world requires an explanation of how,
- Ligne n°1204 : contrary to Evans’s argument, the impossibility of vague identity is
Ligne n°1205 : not a straightforward consequence of the classical conception of
...
Ligne n°1205 : ... not a straightforward consequence of the classical conception of
- Ligne n°1206 : identity, or else the abandonment of that conception.
- Ligne n°1210 : * Baxter, D. L. M., 1988a. “Identity in the Loose and Popular Sense”,
Ligne n°1211 : Mind, 97: 576–582.
...
Ligne n°1211 : ... Mind, 97: 576–582.
- Ligne n°1212 : * Baxter, D. L. M., 1988b. “Many-One Identity ”, Philosophical
Ligne n°1213 : Papers, 17: 193–216.
...
Ligne n°1213 : ... Papers, 17: 193–216.
- Ligne n°1214 : * Baxter, D. L. M., 2001. “Instantiation as Partial Identity ”, The
Ligne n°1215 : Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 79(4): 449–464.
...
Ligne n°1215 : ... Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 79(4): 449–464.
- Ligne n°1216 : * Black, M., 1952. “The Identity of Indiscernibles.”, Mind, 61(242):
Ligne n°1217 : 153–164.
...
Ligne n°1221 : ... Identical to It”, in A. J. Cotnoir and D. L. M. Baxter (eds.),
- Ligne n°1222 : Composition as Identity, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Ligne n°1223 : * Cotnoir, A. J., 2013. “Composition as General Identity”, Oxford
...
Ligne n°1222 : ... Composition as Identity, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Ligne n°1223 : * Cotnoir, A. J., 2013. “Composition as General Identity”, Oxford
Ligne n°1224 : Studies in Metaphysics, 8: 294–322.
...
Ligne n°1224 : ... Studies in Metaphysics, 8: 294–322.
- Ligne n°1225 : * Curtis, B and Noonan, H.W., 2015. “Identity over time, constitution
Ligne n°1226 : and the problem of personal identity”, in S. Miller (ed.), The
...
Ligne n°1225 : ... * Curtis, B and Noonan, H.W., 2015. “Identity over time, constitution
- Ligne n°1226 : and the problem of personal identity”, in S. Miller (ed.), The
Ligne n°1227 : Constitution of Phenomenal Consciousness: Toward a science and
...
Ligne n°1230 : ... Press.
- Ligne n°1231 : * Deutsch, H., 1997. “Identity and General Similarity”, Philosophical
Ligne n°1232 : Perspectives, 12: 177–200.
...
Ligne n°1234 : ... Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
- Ligne n°1235 : * –––, 1991. “Does Quantification involve Identity?” in H.A. Lewis
Ligne n°1236 : (ed.), Peter Geach: Philosophical encounters, Dordrecht: Kluwer
...
Ligne n°1245 : ... * Geach, P., 1972. Logic Matters, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Ligne n°1246 : * –––, 1973. “Ontological relativity and relative identity”, in M.K.
Ligne n°1247 : Munitz (ed.), Logic and Ontology, New York: New York University
...
Ligne n°1252 : ... Philosophical encounters, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
- Ligne n°1253 : * Gibbard, A., 1975. “Contingent identity”, Journal of Philosophical
Ligne n°1254 : Logic, 4: 187–221.
...
Ligne n°1261 : ... Press.
- Ligne n°1262 : * –––, 2014. “Ontological Innocence”, in Composition as Identity, A.
Ligne n°1263 : J. Cotnoir and D. L. M. Baxter (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University
...
Ligne n°1264 : ... Press.
- Ligne n°1265 : * Hawthorne, J., 2003. “Identity”, in M.J. Loux and D.W. Zimmerman
Ligne n°1266 : (eds.), The Oxford handbook of metaphysics, Oxford: Oxford
...
Ligne n°1277 : ... * –––, 1986. On the plurality of worlds, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Ligne n°1278 : * –––, 1988. “Vague identity: Evans misunderstood”, Analysis, 48:
Ligne n°1279 : 128–30.
...
Ligne n°1283 : ... Press, pp. 23–42.
- Ligne n°1284 : * Lowe, E.J., 1989. “What is a criterion of identity?”, Philosophical
Ligne n°1285 : Quarterly, 39: 1–29.
...
Ligne n°1285 : ... Quarterly, 39: 1–29.
- Ligne n°1286 : * –––, 1997. “Objects and criteria of identity”, in B. Hale and C.
Ligne n°1287 : Wright (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Language, Oxford:
...
Ligne n°1288 : ... Blackwell.
- Ligne n°1289 : * Lowe, E.J., 2012. “The probable simplicity of personal identity”,
Ligne n°1290 : in G. Gasser and M. Stefan (eds.), Personal Identity: Complex or
...
Ligne n°1289 : ... * Lowe, E.J., 2012. “The probable simplicity of personal identity”,
- Ligne n°1290 : in G. Gasser and M. Stefan (eds.), Personal Identity: Complex or
Ligne n°1291 : Simple?, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
...
Ligne n°1293 : ... and Essential Properties, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Ligne n°1294 : * Noonan, H.W., 1991. “Indeterminate Identity, Contingent Identity
- Ligne n°1294 : * Noonan, H.W., 1991. “Indeterminate Identity, Contingent Identity
Ligne n°1295 : and Abelardian Predicates”, The Philosophical Quarterly, 41:
...
Ligne n°1296 : ... 183–193.
- Ligne n°1297 : * –––, 1993. “Constitution is Identity”, Mind, 102: 133–146.
Ligne n°1298 : * –––, 2017. “Relative Identity”, in B. Hale, C. Wright and A. Miller
...
Ligne n°1297 : ... * –––, 1993. “Constitution is Identity”, Mind, 102: 133–146.
- Ligne n°1298 : * –––, 2017. “Relative Identity”, in B. Hale, C. Wright and A. Miller
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- Ligne n°1375 : identity: of indiscernibles | identity: relative | identity: transworld
- Ligne n°1375 : identity: of indiscernibles | identity: relative | identity: transworld
- Ligne n°1375 : identity: of indiscernibles | identity: relative | identity: transworld
Ligne n°1376 : | many, problem of | personal identity | temporal parts | vagueness
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Ligne n°1375 : ... identity: of indiscernibles | identity: relative | identity: transworld
- Ligne n°1376 : | many, problem of | personal identity | temporal parts | vagueness