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Forme recherchée : identity|هویت
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- Ligne n°35 : Personal Identity
- Ligne n°39 : Personal identity deals with philosophical questions that arise about
Ligne n°40 : ourselves by virtue of our being people (or, as lawyers and ...- Ligne n°58 : After surveying the main questions of personal identity, the entry will
Ligne n°59 : focus on the one that has received most attention in recent decades, ...
Ligne n°60 : ... namely our persistence through time.- Ligne n°61 : * 1. The Problems of Personal Identity
Ligne n°62 : * 2. Understanding the Persistence Question ...- Ligne n°75 : 1. The Problems of Personal Identity
- Ligne n°77 : There is no single problem of personal identity, but rather a wide
Ligne n°78 : range of questions that are at best loosely connected. Discussions in ...- Ligne n°82 : Who am I? Outside of philosophy, ‘personal identity’ usually refers to
Ligne n°83 : properties to which we feel a special sense of attachment or ownership. ...
Ligne n°83 : ... properties to which we feel a special sense of attachment or ownership.- Ligne n°84 : Someone’s personal identity in this sense consists of those properties
Ligne n°85 : she takes to “define her as a person” or “make her the person she is”, ...
Ligne n°86 : ... and which distinguish her from others. (The precise meaning of these- Ligne n°87 : phrases is hard to pin down.) To have an “identity crisis” is to become
Ligne n°88 : unsure of what one’s most characteristic properties are—of what sort of ...
Ligne n°89 : ... person, in some deep and fundamental sense, one is. This “personal- Ligne n°90 : identity” contrasts with ethnic or national identity, which consists
- Ligne n°90 : identity” contrasts with ethnic or national identity, which consists
Ligne n°91 : roughly of the ethnic group or nation one takes oneself to belong to ...- Ligne n°94 : One’s personal identity in this sense is contingent and temporary: the
Ligne n°95 : way I define myself as a person might have been different, and can vary ...
Ligne n°96 : ... from one time to another. It could happen that being a philosopher and- Ligne n°97 : a parent belong to my identity, but not being a man and living in
Ligne n°98 : Yorkshire, while someone else has the same four properties but feels ...
Ligne n°99 : ... differently towards them, so that being a man and living in Yorkshire- Ligne n°100 : belong to his identity but not being a philosopher or a parent. And
Ligne n°101 : these attitudes are all subject to change. ...
Ligne n°103 : ... Depending on how the term is defined, it may also be possible for a- Ligne n°104 : property to belong to someone’s “identity” without her actually having
Ligne n°105 : it: if I become convinced that I am Napoleon, being an emperor could be ...
Ligne n°106 : ... one of the properties central to the way I define myself, and thus an- Ligne n°107 : element of my identity, even though my belief is false.
Ligne n°109 : ... The Who am I? question—sometimes called the characterization question- Ligne n°110 : (Schechtman 1996: 1)—is what determines someone’s personal identity in
Ligne n°111 : this sense (Glover 1988: part 2, Ludwig 1997). ...
Ligne n°137 : ... that anyone at all who existed back then is you? This is sometimes- Ligne n°138 : called the question of personal identity over time. That’s because it’s
Ligne n°139 : about whether the earlier being and the later being are one or two—that ...
Ligne n°174 : ... The evidence question dominated the anglophone literature on personal- Ligne n°175 : identity from the 1950s to the 1970s (good examples include Shoemaker
Ligne n°176 : 1963, 1970 and Penelhum 1967, 1970). It is important to distinguish it ...- Ligne n°212 : This is sometimes called the problem of “synchronic identity”, as
Ligne n°213 : opposed to the “diachronic identity” of the persistence question. These ...
Ligne n°212 : ... This is sometimes called the problem of “synchronic identity”, as- Ligne n°213 : opposed to the “diachronic identity” of the persistence question. These
Ligne n°214 : terms need careful handling, however. They are apt to give the mistaken ...
Ligne n°214 : ... terms need careful handling, however. They are apt to give the mistaken- Ligne n°215 : impression that identity comes in two kinds, synchronic and diachronic.
Ligne n°216 : The truth is simply that there are two kinds of situations where we can ...- Ligne n°254 : What matters in identity? What is the practical importance of facts
Ligne n°255 : about our persistence? Why does it matter? What reason have you to care ...
Ligne n°268 : ... Each person has a special, selfish interest in her own future and no- Ligne n°269 : one else’s. Identity itself matters practically. But some say that I
Ligne n°270 : could have an entirely selfish reason to care about someone else’s ...
Ligne n°278 : ... concern to him. Likewise, someone else could be responsible for my- Ligne n°279 : actions, and not for his own. Identity itself has no practical
Ligne n°280 : importance. (See Shoemaker 1970: 284; Parfit 1971, 1984: 215, 1995; ...
Ligne n°289 : ... We turn now to the persistence question. Few concepts have been the- Ligne n°290 : source of more misunderstanding than identity over time. The
Ligne n°291 : Persistence Question is often confused with other questions or stated ...
Ligne n°330 : ... to have changed in some important way. This has to do with her- Ligne n°331 : individual identity in the sense of the characterization question—with
Ligne n°332 : what sorts of changes would count as losing the properties that define ...
Ligne n°333 : ... someone as a person. It has nothing to do with persistence. Asking what- Ligne n°334 : it takes for someone to “retain her personal identity”, or to lose it,
Ligne n°335 : also appears to be about characterization rather than persistence. ...
Ligne n°443 : ... to be inherited. (We will return to some of these points.) But most- Ligne n°444 : philosophers writing on personal identity since the early 20th century
Ligne n°445 : have endorsed some version of this view. The memory criterion mentioned ...
Ligne n°470 : ... in our past and their influence on our later decisions and character.- Ligne n°471 : These narratives can be “identity-constituting”. The thought is not
Ligne n°472 : just that they bear on our “personal identity” in the sense of the ...
Ligne n°471 : ... These narratives can be “identity-constituting”. The thought is not- Ligne n°472 : just that they bear on our “personal identity” in the sense of the
Ligne n°473 : characterization question—what sort of people we are in some ...
Ligne n°478 : ... as you are now. Remembering a past event may be necessary for it to- Ligne n°479 : figure in an identity-constituting narrative, but it’s not sufficient,
Ligne n°480 : distinguishing narrativist from psychological-continuity views. ...
Ligne n°522 : ... woman is not the young student. This is an impossible result: if x and- Ligne n°523 : y are one and y and z are one, x and z cannot be two. Identity is
Ligne n°524 : transitive; memory continuity is not. ...
Ligne n°551 : ... with a new concept, “retrocognition” or “quasi-memory”, which is just- Ligne n°552 : like memory but without the identity requirement: even if it’s
Ligne n°553 : self-contradictory to say that you remember doing something you didn’t ...
Ligne n°720 : ... debate whether the multiple-occupancy view can preserve the conviction- Ligne n°721 : that identity is what matters practically.)
Ligne n°868 : ... that we are animals. They say that we are our bodies (Thomson 1997), or- Ligne n°869 : that our identity through time consists in the identity of our bodies
- Ligne n°869 : that our identity through time consists in the identity of our bodies
Ligne n°870 : (Ayer 1936: 194). This has been called the bodily criterion of personal ...
Ligne n°870 : ... (Ayer 1936: 194). This has been called the bodily criterion of personal- Ligne n°871 : identity. It is obscure, and its relation to animalism is uncertain.
Ligne n°918 : ... cannot be settled without considering more general matters outside of- Ligne n°919 : personal identity. For instance, psychological-continuity theorists
Ligne n°920 : need to explain why human organisms are unable to think as we do. This ...
Ligne n°979 : ... Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.- Ligne n°980 : * Behan, D., 1979, ‘Locke on Persons and Personal Identity’, Canadian
Ligne n°981 : Journal of Philosophy, 9: 53–75. ...
Ligne n°992 : ... * Chisholm, R., 1976, Person and Object, La Salle, IL: Open Court.- Ligne n°993 : * DeGrazia, D., 2005, Human Identity and Bioethics, New York:
Ligne n°994 : Cambridge University Press. ...
Ligne n°994 : ... Cambridge University Press.- Ligne n°995 : * Garrett, B., 1998, Personal Identity and Self-Consciousness,
Ligne n°996 : London: Routledge. ...
Ligne n°997 : ... * Glover, J., 1988, I: The Philosophy and Psychology of Personal- Ligne n°998 : Identity, London: Penguin.
Ligne n°999 : * Heller, M., 1990, The Ontology of Physical Objects: ...
Ligne n°1001 : ... Press.- Ligne n°1002 : * Hirsch, E., 1982, The Concept of Identity, Oxford, Oxford
Ligne n°1003 : University Press. ...
Ligne n°1019 : ... P. Snowdon (eds.), Animalism: New Essays on Persons, Animals, and- Ligne n°1020 : Identity, Oxford University Press: 89–127.
Ligne n°1021 : * Langford, S., 2014, ‘On What We are and How We Persist’, Pacific ...
Ligne n°1024 : ... Philosophy, 47: 613–630.- Ligne n°1025 : * Lewis, D., 1976, ‘Survival and Identity’, in A. Rorty (ed.), The
Ligne n°1026 : Identities of Persons, Berkeley, CA: University of California ...
Ligne n°1033 : ... University Press.- Ligne n°1034 : * –––, 2012, ‘The Probable Simplicity of Personal Identity’, in
Ligne n°1035 : Personal Identity: Simple or Complex?, G. Gasser and M. Stefan ...
Ligne n°1034 : ... * –––, 2012, ‘The Probable Simplicity of Personal Identity’, in- Ligne n°1035 : Personal Identity: Simple or Complex?, G. Gasser and M. Stefan
Ligne n°1036 : (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ...
Ligne n°1038 : ... University Press.- Ligne n°1039 : * Mackie, D., 1999, ‘Personal Identity and Dead People’,
Ligne n°1040 : Philosophical Studies, 95: 219–242. ...
Ligne n°1044 : ... Press.- Ligne n°1045 : * Martin, R. and J. Barresi (eds.), 2003, Personal Identity, Oxford:
Ligne n°1046 : Blackwell. ...
Ligne n°1048 : ... Parfit, J. Dancy (ed.), Oxford: Blackwell.- Ligne n°1049 : * Merricks, T., 1998, ‘There Are No Criteria of Identity Over Time’,
Ligne n°1050 : Noûs, 32: 106–124. ...
Ligne n°1056 : ... * Nichols, S. and M. Bruno, 2010, ‘Intuitions about Personal- Ligne n°1057 : Identity: An Empirical Study’, Philosophical Psychology, 23:
Ligne n°1058 : 293–312. ...
Ligne n°1060 : ... Controversy’, Philosophical Quarterly, 48: 302–318.- Ligne n°1061 : * –––, 2003, Personal Identity, second edition, London: Routledge.
Ligne n°1062 : * –––, 2010, ‘The Thinking Animal Problem and Personal Pronoun ...
Ligne n°1063 : ... Revisionism’, Analysis, 70: 93–98.- Ligne n°1064 : * –––, 2011, ‘The Complex and Simple Views of Personal Identity’,
Ligne n°1065 : Analysis, 71: 72–77. ...
Ligne n°1065 : ... Analysis, 71: 72–77.- Ligne n°1066 : * –––, 2019, ‘Personal Identity: The Simple and Complex Views
Ligne n°1067 : Revisited’, Disputatio, 11: 9–22. ...
Ligne n°1069 : ... Harvard University Press.- Ligne n°1070 : * Olson, E., 1997. The Human Animal: Personal Identity Without
Ligne n°1071 : Psychology, New York: Oxford University Press. ...
Ligne n°1079 : ... Oxford University Press.- Ligne n°1080 : * –––, 2012, ‘In Search of the Simple View’, in Personal Identity:
Ligne n°1081 : Simple or Complex?, G. Gasser and M. Stefan (eds.), Cambridge: ...
Ligne n°1089 : ... Journal of Philosophy, 49: 419–434.- Ligne n°1090 : * Parfit, D., 1971, ‘Personal Identity’, Philosophical Review, 80:
Ligne n°1091 : 3–27; reprinted in Perry 1975. ...
Ligne n°1094 : ... * –––, 1984, Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press.- Ligne n°1095 : * –––, 1995, ‘The Unimportance of Identity’, in Identity, H. Harris
- Ligne n°1095 : * –––, 1995, ‘The Unimportance of Identity’, in Identity, H. Harris
Ligne n°1096 : (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press; reprinted in Martin and ...
Ligne n°1098 : ... * –––, 2012, ‘We Are Not Human Beings’, Philosophy, 87: 5–28.- Ligne n°1099 : * Penelhum, T., 1967, ‘Personal Identity’, in The Encyclopedia of
Ligne n°1100 : Philosophy (Volume 6), P. Edwards (ed.), New York: Macmillan. ...
Ligne n°1103 : ... 463–488.- Ligne n°1104 : * ––– (ed.), 1975, Personal Identity, Berkeley: University of
Ligne n°1105 : California Press. ...
Ligne n°1105 : ... California Press.- Ligne n°1106 : * Puccetti, R., 1973, ‘Brain Bisection and Personal Identity’,
Ligne n°1107 : British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 24: 339–355. ...
Ligne n°1123 : ... * –––, 2001, ‘Empathic Access: The Missing Ingredient in Personal- Ligne n°1124 : Identity’, Philosophical Explorations, 4(2): 94–110; reprinted in
Ligne n°1125 : Martin and Barresi 2003. ...
Ligne n°1126 : ... * Schroer, J. W. and R. Schroer, 2014, ‘Getting the Story Right: A- Ligne n°1127 : Reductionist Narrative Account of Personal Identity’, Philosophical
Ligne n°1128 : Studies, 171: 445–469. ...
Ligne n°1128 : ... Studies, 171: 445–469.- Ligne n°1129 : * Shoemaker, S., 1963, Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity, Ithaca:
Ligne n°1130 : Cornell University Press. ...
Ligne n°1132 : ... Quarterly, 7: 269–285.- Ligne n°1133 : * –––, 1979, ‘Identity, Properties, and Causality’, Midwest Studies
Ligne n°1134 : in Philosophy, 4: 321–342. ...
Ligne n°1134 : ... in Philosophy, 4: 321–342.- Ligne n°1135 : * –––, 1984, ‘Personal Identity: A Materialist’s Account’, in
Ligne n°1136 : Shoemaker and Swinburne, Personal Identity, Oxford: Blackwell. ...
Ligne n°1135 : ... * –––, 1984, ‘Personal Identity: A Materialist’s Account’, in- Ligne n°1136 : Shoemaker and Swinburne, Personal Identity, Oxford: Blackwell.
Ligne n°1137 : * –––, 1997, ‘Self and Substance’, in Philosophical Perspectives ...
Ligne n°1140 : ... Aristotelian Society (Supplementary Volume), 73: 287–306.- Ligne n°1141 : * –––, 2008, ‘Persons, Animals, and Identity’, Synthese, 163:
Ligne n°1142 : 313–324. ...
Ligne n°1144 : ... Gallagher (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press.- Ligne n°1145 : * –––, 2012, ‘Against Simplicity’, in Personal Identity: Simple or
Ligne n°1146 : Complex?, G. Gasser and M. Stefan (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge ...
Ligne n°1149 : ... Press.- Ligne n°1150 : * –––, 2001b, ‘Criteria of Personal Identity and the Limits of
Ligne n°1151 : Conceptual Analysis’, Philosophical Perspectives (Volume 15: ...
Ligne n°1158 : ... and the Human Mind, C. Gill. (ed.), Oxford: Clarendon Press.- Ligne n°1159 : * –––, 1996, ‘Persons and Personal Identity’, in Essays for David
Ligne n°1160 : Wiggins: Identity, Truth and Value, S. Lovibond and S. G. Williams ...
Ligne n°1159 : ... * –––, 1996, ‘Persons and Personal Identity’, in Essays for David- Ligne n°1160 : Wiggins: Identity, Truth and Value, S. Lovibond and S. G. Williams
Ligne n°1161 : (ed.), Oxford: Blackwell. ...
Ligne n°1165 : ... and Other Essays, 189–207, Oxford: Oxford University Press.- Ligne n°1166 : * Swinburne, R., 1984, ‘Personal Identity: The Dualist Theory’, in
Ligne n°1167 : Shoemaker and Swinburne, Personal Identity, Oxford: Blackwell. ...
Ligne n°1166 : ... * Swinburne, R., 1984, ‘Personal Identity: The Dualist Theory’, in- Ligne n°1167 : Shoemaker and Swinburne, Personal Identity, Oxford: Blackwell.
Ligne n°1168 : * Thomson, J. J., 1997, ‘People and Their Bodies’, in Reading Parfit, ...
Ligne n°1169 : ... J. Dancy (ed.), Oxford: Blackwell.- Ligne n°1170 : * Unger, P., 1979, ‘I do not Exist’, in Perception and Identity, G.
Ligne n°1171 : F. MacDonald (ed.), London: Macmillan; reprinted in Rea 1997. ...
Ligne n°1171 : ... F. MacDonald (ed.), London: Macmillan; reprinted in Rea 1997.- Ligne n°1172 : * –––, 1990, Identity, Consciousness, and Value, Oxford: Oxford
Ligne n°1173 : University Press. ...
Ligne n°1181 : ... * –––, 1997, ‘Materialism and the Psychological-Continuity Account of- Ligne n°1182 : Personal Identity’, in Philosophical Perspectives (Volume 11: Mind,
Ligne n°1183 : Causation, and World): 305–319; reprinted in van Inwagen, Ontology, ...
Ligne n°1183 : ... Causation, and World): 305–319; reprinted in van Inwagen, Ontology,- Ligne n°1184 : Identity, and Modality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
Ligne n°1185 : 2001. ...
Ligne n°1187 : ... * Wilkes, K., 1988, Real People, Oxford: Clarendon Press.- Ligne n°1188 : * Williams, B., 1956–7, ‘Personal Identity and Individuation’,
Ligne n°1189 : Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 57: 229–252; reprinted in ...
Ligne n°1198 : ... University Press.- Ligne n°1199 : * Zimmerman, D., 1998, ‘Criteria of Identity and the “Identity
- Ligne n°1199 : * Zimmerman, D., 1998, ‘Criteria of Identity and the “Identity
Ligne n°1200 : Mystics”’, Erkenntnis, 48: 281–301. ...- Ligne n°1214 : * PhilPapers bibliography on personal identity
Ligne n°1215 : * Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View, symposium on the book by ...- Ligne n°1224 : animalism | identity | identity: relative | Locke, John | mind: in
- Ligne n°1224 : animalism | identity | identity: relative | Locke, John | mind: in
Ligne n°1225 : Indian Buddhist Philosophy | personal identity: and ethics | temporal ...
Ligne n°1224 : ... animalism | identity | identity: relative | Locke, John | mind: in- Ligne n°1225 : Indian Buddhist Philosophy | personal identity: and ethics | temporal
Ligne n°1226 : parts | zombies ...
Ligne n°1230 : ... Some material in this entry appeared previously in E. Olson, ‘Personal- Ligne n°1231 : Identity’, in The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Mind, edited by
Ligne n°1232 : S. Stich and T. Warfield, Oxford: Blackwell, 2003. ...