#Eastern Europe Economy Watch - Atom Eastern Europe Economy Watch - RSS IFRAME: http://www.blogger.com/navbar.g?targetBlogID=1443720106009957151&blogNa me=Eastern+Europe+Economy+Watch&publishMode=PUBLISH_MODE_BLOGSPOT&navba rType=BLUE&layoutType=LAYOUTS&searchRoot=http://easterneuropeeconomy.bl ogspot.com/search&blogLocale=en_US&homepageUrl=http://easterneuropeecon omy.blogspot.com/&vt=5588396684152951608 skip to main | skip to sidebar Eastern Europe Economy Watch Economists set themselves too easy, too useless a task if in tempestuous seasons they can only tell us that when the storm is long past, the ocean is flat again John Maynard Keynes Facebook Economics Edward Hugh has a lively and enjoyable Facebook community where he publishes frequent breaking news economics links and short updates. If you would like to receive these updates on a regular basis and join the debate please invite Edward as a friend by clicking the Facebook link at the top of the right sidebar. Thursday, August 18, 2011 Eastern European Growth - Coming Rapidly Off The Boil? The latest round of EU GDP data, brought to light a reality which many who have been closely following the economies of Eastern Europe already suspected: that the heavily export dependent economies in the region would almost inevitably be dragged down by the rapid slowdown in Europe's principal economic motor, the German economy (see this post for background). Read more » Posted by Edward Hugh at 6:26 PM 0 comments Thursday, July 7, 2011 Smoke On The East European Horizon? "The market is pricing these sovereigns at much wider levels than where their agency ratings would imply," said Diana Allmendinger, a director at Fitch Solutions.CDS on Italy imply a rating of BBB, five notches below its agency rating of AA-minus. And Spain's implied rating is BB-plus, nine notches below its agency rating of AA-plus. With so much emphasis being placed on what has been happening farther to the South, economic realities on Europe's Eastern periphery have largely been escaping the close scrutiny of media and analyst attention. In the wake of the belated recognition of the region's vulnerability which followed the bout of acute stress experienced during the post-Lehman crisis, a new consensus has now emerged (for an in-depth study of the Latvian example see this piece) that the IMF-guided programmes put in place at the time have essentially set things, if not entirely straight then at least on the right track. In particular, as a result of the extensive fiscal discipline and willingness to sacrifice shown a much brighter future now awaits these countries well to the sidelines of all those horrible Greek debt concerns. Certainly this is the picture you get from looking at the way the ratings agencies have been treating many of the countries in the region. Only last week Fitch upgraded Estonia to A+, citing the country's solid economic growth performance, exceptionally strong public finances, declining external debt ratios and increasing stabilization in the banking sector. But since many reservations have been being expressed in Europe of late about the validity of rating assessments, I thought it might be interesting to seek out an alternative opinion, and take a look at what the financial markets have been saying, at least as far as the recent evolution of Credit Default Swap prices go. The recently upgraded Estonia, for example, was being valued as recently as just two years agao as having the third-riskiest sovereign debt in the European Union. But the country is now trading in quite another league, and finds itself included among the European "top ten" sovereigns in terms of price. As reported by Bloomberg on 20 June, Estonian credit-default swaps were trading at 87 basis points, while France was being quoted at 83.7, the Czech Republic at 83, Austria at 68.7 and the U.K. at 66, according to data provided by CMA. By way of comparison Polish CDS stood at 159.6. Effectively, Poland was being considered as almost twice as risky as Estonia. The big question, of course, is whether this kind of realignment in valuations make any kind of economic sense? Is contagion risk being reasonably priced in, and if it isn't, do we face the risk of a sudden (and destabilising) adjustment in the not too distant future? Obviously, it is clear that the Estonian Sovereign was never, even during the worst moments of the financial crisis, and under the most severe of worst case scenarios, the third riskiest that was to be found within the frontiers of the EU (Estonia was the only EU country to have a budget surplus last year - worth 0.1 percent of GDP - while public debt totaled a mere 6.6 percent). On the other hand it is the case that Estonia faced an extremely challenging crisis in 2008/09, and had the Euro peg collapsed in one of the four East European countries who had one at the time then the pressure of private debt could certainly have confronted the country with some very complex and difficult choices. So, if we all stop being emotional about CDS for a moment, and start to consider that they might be a traded instrument which can tell us not who is about to default but rather something about the perceived levels of country risk at a given moment in time then they might offer us some sort of yardstick for following how market sentiment is moving, and even (the case in point for my argument here) whether market pricing of relative risks is in line with economic fundamentals. So, following the argument along a bit, it is far from clear that the current level of Estonian CDS prices risk in in any more satisfactory way than they did at the height of the crisis, since as we will see there are rather curious anomalies in the way in which some of the countries in the region are being priced, while an excessive short term emphasis on fiscal deficits has perhaps mislead observers about real risks in Europe whether these lie to the South (Italy) or to the East. It is not my intention here to single out Estonia for special - negative - treatment (that would not be warranted) but the value being placed on the CDS really is incredibly low for a country that just entered a Euro Area whose outlook could, at the very least, be considered as reasonably uncertain. It is being priced as part of core Europe, when in reality it forms part of Europe's periphery. Arguably, were the Euro to break in two, Estonia would incline towards riding with the German lead group, but given the fact that the country now has a totally export dependent economy (this is the part that I feel is least understood) , and a currency which was arguably over valued at the time of Euro entry (and the country now has ongoing above-Eurozone-average inflation) it is not clear how prepared the country would be to handle the challenges of being attached to the new, and ultra-high value, currency which would be created. Of course, some are going to argue that the risk of this happening is slim, but is this risk, small as it may be, currently being priced in? That is the question. I suggest it isn't, and this creates the possibility of a dangerous surprise in the markets in the event of a disorderly Greek default. Strangely, as a country which has recently entered the common currency, country risk seems to have followed a path which is rather nearer to that of its Baltic peers that equivalent Euro Area countries. This disparity becomes even more striking if we look at the evolution of Baltic CDS with those of the two countries in Eastern Europe who entered the Eurozone before Estonia. The spread on Slovenian and Slovakian CDS has surged in recent months, not because short term risk of sovereign default in either of these two countries has increased notably, but simply because these two countries as members of a Eurozone with known problems, and real contagion dangers, are now seen as being more risky. So why isn't this the case with Estonia? True Slovenian and Slovakian CDS are still comparatively low risk priced (Slovenia at 109 and Slovakia at 102) but it is the direction and velocity of the movement which is striking, and especially in comparison with Euro Area peer Estonia. Why are these two countries considered to be more at risk than Estonia, especially given the size of the latter's recent historic legacy? Moving beyond the Baltics, risk in a number of other East European countries seems quite mispriced, unless we think that only being pegged to the Euro (rather than actually being a member of it) is a less risky mode to live in. Bulgarian CDS (currently around 225) have been steadily moving down all this year, and in sharp contrast to what happened in June last year, have so far not responded to the Greek crisis, despite the fact that Bulgaria's banks are quite dependent on their Greek parents for funding. The picture in Romania is rather similar, with the current price of 250 being well off last years highs of around 415, which means that markets are currently perceiving risk in Spain and Italy as more pronounced than those in Bulgaria and Romania. Certainly I would not want to argue that risk in both the aforementioned countries is high, but I am not at all convinced that contagion risk in the latter two is anything like as low as is being suggested, which is presumably why Nomura was recently advising clients in a research note to sell South African CDS and buy the wrongly priced Bulgarian and Romanian ones (also see here). Looking at the macro economic fundamentals of the respective cases, I can't help feeling that in this case the analysts are right. And if we move over to Hungary, then we find that as of last Friday CDS stood at around 285, well below the highs of over 400 seen as recently as last November in the wake of the Irish crisis. Arguably the Hungarian case is the most glaring one, since it is the East European country with the highest debt to GDP levels (around 80%) it has very high gross foreign debt (around 135% of GDP, of which 45% is forex denominated), and it is a country where institutional quality is a constant cause for concern. In many ways Hungary is the Italy of the East. Apart from the presence of a strong trade surplus there is not that much to commend in Hungary's recent economic performance, yet its CDS has fallen into line with a regional pattern, and there is little in the way of what is happening in Spain and Italy to be seen in the spread, let alone what is going on in Slovenia and Slovakia. Both Hungary and Romania were the object of IMF/EU rescues during the height of the financial crisis, and as a result their financing problems subsided. Both countries have made substantial progress in reducing their fiscal deficits, and have carried out a number of structural reforms. But both countries still have high levels of external indebtedness coupled with economies which are now extraordinarily export dependent for growth. In addition the demographic outlook for many of these countries is absolutely dire, and you will continually have smaller and older workforces trying to pay down increasing quantities of debt. This underlying reality constitutes an unstable combination which make the countries concerned highly vulnerable to both a renewed deterioration in sentiment and an external economic slowdown of the sort we could see following a disorderly Greek default, and yet markets in general seems to be shrugging off the risk as almost non existent. "Smoke on the horizon" the admiral said as he lowered the telescope from his blind eye, "I see no smoke on the horizon". This post first appeared on my Roubini Global Economonitor Blog "Don't Shoot The Messenger". Posted by Edward Hugh at 11:45 AM 0 comments Thursday, January 13, 2011 And Then There Were Seventeen.... "If you know your Thucydides and the Melian dialogue you know that small countries rely most on everyone following the rules. That's why we follow the rules. If there are no rules, then the big will do what they want," Estonian President Toomas Ilves in an interview with the EUobserver In a blog post which has gathered a certain notoriety, Paul Krugman recently sent the Estonians his condolences. I will send them, not my condolences, but my congratulations, and these not for the somewhat dubious honour of being allowed to join the Eurozone, or even for having carried out a highly successful "internal devaluation" (this outcome is still in doubt), but rather for their stubborness, courage and tenacity. These are indeed hard (and enduring) men and women. And in honour of their courage I offer them a homage, in the form of two charts. The first of these is the latest Estonian industrial production one. While the second is the Spanish equivalent. Can you spot the difference? If not squint a little closer. Estonia's economy fell by around 18% during the crisis, while Spain's has so far has fallen only by something like 7%, yet Estonia's industrial output is now almost back to where it was before the crisis started, while Spain's has fallen but so far not recovered. No sign of even the tiniest green shoot. Curiously, Spain's political leaders constantly complain that the markets are being unfair to their country, and are underestimating their ability and determination in responding to the crisis, yet if we compare the relative performances of the industrial sectors in the two countries, it is pretty obvious why the markets entertain the doubts they do. Both are destined now to live from exports, but one country is evidently living rather better from them than the other. It is clear that companies in the Estonian industrial sector have been far more agile in diversifing and finding new markets than have their Spanish counterparts. Both countries experienced a construction lead "boom-bust" (Spain's of rather larger proportions than the Estonian one), and consequently now face highly impaired domestic demand, yet the Estonians have succeeded where the Spaniards have failed, by shifting a part of their previously inwardlooking industrial base towards the outside world and towards growth. There is simply no other explanation for the evident discrepancy, since (as we will see below) Estonia's industry is not growing due to the pull of domestic demand, although it is on the point of returning to "back to normal" operating levels. Spain's export sector is also recovering (after all the external demand is now there), but the part of Spain's industry which is geared towards supplying domestic demand simply hasn't been able to adapt, and is still contracting along with domestic consumption. In fact it is still contracting so rapidly that that the shrinkage is totally cancelling out all the fine work being done by the companies who are doing all the exporting, which is why industrial output remains more or less stationary, and the Spanish economy fails to return to life. Many Rivers Left To Cross Well that, as they say, was the good news. What follows possibly won't be anything like so palatable for Estonians to read as what went before, which doesn't mean it isn't worth reading and thinking about. You see, that old black magic (sorry, devaluation) debate, was never about whether or not the Estonian export sector could recover to its old level after the economic contraction came to a halt. As I keep stressing, it is obvious that it could, since in this case recovery depends on factors external to Estonia, and these factors have now changed, as a number of countries have seriously started to recover. No, the issue was always about the fact that the Estonian economy had become severely distorted during the boom years, and that the existing export sector was too small to do the heavy lifting that was going to be required of it after the bust in domestic demand. How many times did people say to me during those early days "but what can we export?", or "don't you realise that Estonian exports are largely re-exports of processed imported goods", as if these added disadvantages made the situation any easier, or my arguments somehow irrelevant. When a country is in trouble, but really in trouble, one of the first signs, I reckon, of the depth of the problem is that you get a long queue of official economists lining up to give you a thousand and one reasons why it is going to be impossible to export your way out of difficulty. This is like a leading indicator for "problems looming", since the situation has become so serious that effective solutions are virtually beyond the realm of the thinkable, and we need to soothe ourselves with nice sounding palliatives. In the realm of economic science, however, reality has a nasty habit of coming back and waking us from our slumbers. What all this really suggests to me is that the thrust of the original argument about why the size of the export sector needs to increase sharply in economnies which have become so badly distorted as the Estonian and Spanish ones have was never really properly understood. So it is in honour of all those valiant Estonians who have sacrificed so much in order to gain so little that I endeavor just one more time to make things clear (my original pieces on Estonia's internal devaluation can be found here and here). The Estonian Economy Is Recovering! As one-commentator-after-another never tires of informing us, the Estonian economy has returned to some sort of growth recently, indeed (hat tip to Krugman) the Washington Post even went so far as to lump it together with Germany as one of Europe's “growing economies”, while the Economist Central Europe correspondent described it as a Nordic Kitten, seemingly a designation created to distance it from its more problematic Baltic neighbours. Unfortunately, wine doesn't improve simply by changing the label on the bottle (even if it does now say “appellation Frankfurt controlé”), and Estonia is neither a growth economy (which is the Goldman Sachs term for the new Emerging Market tigers like India, Indonesia, Turkey and Brazil) nor is it a "growing one", it is simply a "steadily recovering" one, and what's more, given the severity of the challenges it still faces it is far from having entirely managed to distance itself from the set of economic problems characteristic of what has come to be known as the “Baltic syndrome”. Yes, Estonia’s economy has now started to grow again, indeed it was up by an annual 5% in the third quarter. But, to put this number in context, it was still down by around 16% from the Q4 2007 high, and just below the level of Q3 2005. So there is still rather a long way to go to get back to meaningful growth, indeed so long, as Krugman again points out, that IMF forecasts don't contemplate the country's economy reaching its 2007 level again before 2015 (Germany just more-or-less hit its 2007 level in 2010). So, what is slowing the recovery down? Well, as I indicated at the start of this post, it certainly isn't the industries in the country's export sector, which are now more or less back to where they were before the crisis started. But rather the problem lies in the state of private domestic demand, which obviously isn’t recovering. As the Estonian Central Bank put it in their economicpolicy statements (and here, and here) on the latest GDP numbers: “Estonia's recovery has been mostly driven by exports, which, measured in current prices, reached close to the all-time high in September”, and “Export growth indicates that the economic activity of our main export partners is expanding quickly and Estonia's companies are making good use of it.... The export volume of industrial production reached a historical high in the third quarter. Irrespective of the continuously weak domestic demand, the sale of industrial production started to pick up in the domestic market as well, but it is still some 25% below the pre-crisis level.... since unemployment continues to be high, the level of consumers' income and purchasing power will remain weak in the next years”. And as the central bank also point out, export growth will now be harder (that is we have now picked most of the low lying fruit). “Though most of industrial enterprises still have under-utilised production capacity, the existing capacity stock is running out along with rapidly expanding sales volumes. This refers to the need for additional investment”. Yet, unfortunately, the sad truth is that investment activity has still not picked up. This lack of series investment in fixed capital contrasts sharply with recent movements on the equities side, since, according to Bloomberg data, Estonian stocks are valued at an average of 16 times estimated earnings, compared with 11.3 times for Polish and Czech shares, and 12.6 times for Slovenia (the chart sort of resembles the export one, doesn't it?). But the issue is this: following a pattern seen in many emerging markets over the last 12 months, short-term fund inflows pushed values on the Tallinn exchange up by some 73% in 2010, making it the third-best performance worldwide, according to Bloomberg data. They also quote Tallinn-based SEB researcher Peeter Koppel as saying: “Euro adoption has somehow triggered more widespread thinking about saving and investing in general,”...... Foreign retail investors “now have the hard fact of euro and the certain caution, especially from the Scandinavian side, is gone.” Which sounds to me more like “previously wary investors have now thrown caution to the wind,” on the back of all the pro-Euro Nordic-kitten hype. What Estonia needs, and is not getting (as the central bank itself recognises) is serious, long term, FDI for greenfield projects generating jobs and output in the export sector. Boosting Domestic Demand Means Increasing The Size of the Export Sector & Creating Employment As I say, in contrast to what is happening in the external sector domestic demand is far from recovering. Retail sales were up 5% (at constant prices) in November over November 2009, and 1% in October. But the annual rise is more a by-product of the very low level of sales hit in November last year, and in fact between January and November 2010, retail sales were down 4% compared to the same period in 2009. The domestic construction sector isn’t recovering either. According to Statistics Estonia, the total production of Estonian construction enterprises increased 1.2% in Q3 2010 compared with a year earlier. But when you read the fine print, the increase was entirely produced by construction companies operating abroad (whose activity was up by 25%) – ie once more it is a question of exports. And in fact construction output inside Estonia fell by around 1% compared to the 3rd quarter of 2009, and even this drop only wasn’t larger due to the availability of EU infrastructure funding, since the volume of building construction decreased 9% while the volume of civil engineering increased 15% at constant prices. According to data from the Estonian Register of Construction Works, in the 3rd quarter of 2010 there were only 481 housing units completed - 50% down on the same period of 2009. 65% of these were flats, the majority majority of them in Tallinn. As the Central Bank point out, domestic demand can only improve in a sustained way if there is a major improvement in the labour market, but as they also stress, this is only recovering slowly, with the unemployment rate declining to 15.5% in the third quarter, and with the need to improve productivity and only low growth expected in the quarters to come, unemployment is likely to remain high for several years. So despite the recovery in external demand, as was to be expected the demand for domestic credit far from recovering continues to contract, whether we are talking about corporates: or about households: or about housing mortgages: Added to this, the way that fiscal austerity was implemented (raising VAT, and fuel costs) has meant that the Estonian price level, far from continuing to deflate (which is what is needed to increase competitiveness quickly enough) is now rising again, and at around 5.5% (my estimated HICP, the Estonian CPI was up 5.7% but the weightings are different) is well above the 2.2% estimate for the Euro Area, or the 1.9% December inflation estimated for Germany by the Federal Statistics Office. Perhaps one of the clearest indications of the malfunctioning of the Eurozone as currently structured is that the Germany economy (which is recovering rapidly) is experiencing far higher levels of inflation than the Eurozone periphery, which in theory should be deflating to recover competitiveness. True Estonia did begin to recover some part of the lost competitiveness, and unit labour costs as compared with some key competitors did start to improve, but this process slowed considerably in the first two quarters of 2010, marked time in the third one, and may actually have started to deteriorate again in the final quarter as inflation accelerates (OECD data - please click on image for better viewing). Hourly wages (on a moving average basis) seem to have stopped falling, and the next move will almost certainly be up as inflation bites in. True, the Central Bank would undoubtedly argue that much of the inflation was due to food and energy, and that core inflation was running much lower (1.2% in November), but it is hard to see the impact of movements in the leading CPI not feeding through into wages, and producer prices (another important measure of industrial costs) were up an annual 4.5% in November. And Its A Hard Road To Travel! In his most recent assessment of the Estonian situation (Toughing It Out: How the Baltics Defied Predictions) Christof Rosenberg (former coordinator of the IMF baltic intervention, and current head of the Fund's Hungary mission - this man also likes hard challenges!) also pays hommage to the grit and flexibility of the Baltic populations (a characteristic I also wholeheartedly applaud), but he draws a conclusion which I feel is as yet at best premature. "The Baltic experience demonstrates that large economic adjustment, including nominal wage and benefit cuts, is indeed possible under a currency peg (or, for that matter, in a currency union)". Certainly, as Christoff points out, a large correction has taken place in Estonia. The current account, for example, is now in surplus. The issues I am raising is whether this correction is enough, or whether it is sustainable. As the Bank of Estonia note, the Non-performing loans situation has been stabilised, and the value of loans overdue for more than 60 days contracted by over 250 million kroons in November to stand at 6.8 per cent of the total loan portfolio. But most of the old loans are still there, they have not been cleaned from the books, and have been sustained and refinanced by what Christoff calls the "deep pockets" of the Scandinavian lenders. These loans would be once more put into question by any renewal of the internal devaluation and serious price deflation. So hard decisions are going to need to be taken. Inflation is already excessive, and net-exports are nowhere near large enough as a proportion of GDP to carry the economy forward with a strong growth dynamic. Indeed the IMF itself is forecasting a return of growing current account deficits after 2013, which should alert us to the fact that all is not yet as it should be, by a long way. Thus, in conclusion, I think it is very true to say, as Christof does, that it still far too early to pass any kind of definitive judgement on the success or otherwise of what he calls "the Baltic strategy". There is still a very long hard road out there in front, and the hardest and steepest part may well be yet to come. Posted by Edward Hugh at 2:11 PM 0 comments Older Posts Home Subscribe to: Posts (Atom) Our Personal Blogs Alpha Sources Bonobo Land Edward Hugh Blog RSS Feed Global Economic Perspectives Edward Hugh's Facebook Page Edward Hugh's Facebook Page Links, Comments, Debate and Much, Much More Global Site Meter Site Meter Blog Home Page Site Meter Eastern Europe Country Blogs Baltic Economy Watch Czech Economy Watch Hungary Economy Watch Latvia Economy Watch Poland Economy Watch Romania Economy Watch Russia Economy Watch Turkey Economy Watch Ukraine Economy Watch Emerging Economies Albania Economy Watch Eurozone Global Economic Perspectives French Economy Watch German Economy Watch Greece Economy Watch Italy Economy Watch Spain Economy Watch Asia Site Meter China Economy Watch Indian Economy Blog India Economy Watch Japan Economy Watch Philippines Economy Watch South Korea Economy Watch Thailand Economy Watch Latin America Site Meter Argentina Economy Watch Brazil Economy Watch Chile Economy Watch Demography Site Meter What is Eastern Europe Economy Watch? Eastern Europe Economy Watch is a weblog - run by Claus Vistesen and Edward Hugh - which is dedicated to following the day to day progress of the economies of the European Union Accession States - Bulgaria, Romania, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Hungary, Slovakia, The Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia. The Weblog arose out of our curiosity concerning the roots of the particular mix of economic problems which these economies now seem to be facing, about what can be done to address these problems, and about what might be learned from studying the development of these economies as they evolve. The Eastern European economies have attracted a lot of interest from the international financial investment community in recent years, but the underlying macro economic reality is, in fact, very different from what many assume. The Eastern European states share a common history and a common demography. This means they face - despite all the individual nuances - a historically unprecedented combination of structural problems, which in large measure stem from an extraordinarily high inward flow of funds (especially in the banking sector,which has tended to lead to excessively strong levels of credit-driven consumer demand) accompanied by an equally high outflow of labour through migration (which leads to insufficient domestic labour supply to meet the needs of the high growth rate produced by the funds inflow). The impact of the migration outflow is further aggravated by the rather low number of young labour market entrants who are now becoming available - a position which can only be anticipated to deteriorate over the coming years - since it is a direct consequence the collapse in fertility and live births which the all these countries experienced following the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. The issue is further complicated by the fact that these economies all need to experience very rapid "catch up" growth to converge on the living standard levels of their Western European neighbours, and if they are indeed to become rich before they grow old, a move which is vital for them if they are to achieve the resources which will make supporting the increasing number of elderly dependents both viable and sustainable. The future of Eastern Europe is indeed a race against the clock. Needless to say none of these problems were ever really contemplated when the present generation of economic text books were written. Dealing with this whole problem set has become a most pressing concern, both theoretically and practically, especially given the heavy degree of dependence on these economies which is shown by some export driven Western European economies like Germany and Austria. A great deal more background and information about the theoretical perspective which informs this blog may be found over at the Demography Matters blog. Edward's Website Edward Hugh Mainpage My Catalan Blog El Cafè de la República (Sucursal Putxet) Edward's "Other" Blogs The Art of Film Memory In Memory of Art The Music of Chance Celestina Round Midnight United States United States Economy Watch Special Mention A Fistful Of Euros Electoral Panorama Indian Economy Blog MacroMan Credit Writedowns New Economist Macro Blog Brad Setser Economists View EconBrowser Eurozone Watch Evening Distribution Poland Economy Watch Loading... Baltic Economy Posts Running Out of Capacity in Central and Eastern Europe Lithuania Under The Loop End of the Road in Lithuania? Addressing Labour Shortages in Estonia Migration in the Baltics The Latvian Economy Latvian Population Dynamics Hard or Soft Landing in Latvia? Estonia's Economy in Perspective Eurozone Related Posts Structural Aspects of German Export Dependence Part One Structural Aspects of German Export Dependence Part Two Serbia, That Incredible Shrinking Country Iceland's Smeltering Economy Macroeconomic Adjustment in the Euro Area: The Irish Case France - Europe's New Sick Man? Eurozone - Continuing The Hike? Ageing in Germany - An Important Impact The Eurozone - A Structural Assessment Ageing Related Posts Of Population Pyramids and Value Chains Central Bankers and Median Ages The Ongoing Demographic Transition Much Ado About Ageing? Neo-Classical Growth? Immigration, Ageing Populations and Economic Growth Ferenc Puskas and Life Expectancy Fertility in Europe demography.matters.blog Loading... East European Blogs Latvian Abroad All About Latvia Peteris Cedrins Riga Daily Photos FotoLat Itching for Eestimaa Lituanica Blogus Daniel Antal Central European Economics Watch Window on Eurasia Ukraine News Blog Neeka's Backlog About Edward 'the bonobo' is a Catalan economist of British extraction based in Barcelona. By inclination he is a macro economist, but his obsession with trying to understand the economic impact of demographic changes has often taken him far from home, off and away from the more tranquil and placid pastures of the dismal science, into the bracken and thicket of demography, anthropology, biology, sociology and systems theory. All of which has lead him to ask himself whether Thomas Wolfe was not in fact right when he asserted that the fact of the matter is "you can never go home again". He is currently working on a book with the provisional working title "Population, the Ultimate Non-renewable Resource". Apart from his participation in A Fistful of Euros, Edward also writes regularly for the demography blog Demography Matters. He also contributes to the Indian Economy blog . His personal weblog is Bonobo Land . Edward's website can be found at EdwardHugh.net. Latvia Economy Watch Loading... Economics Blogs Brad DeLong Nouriel Roubini The Big Picture Atanu Dey Neuronomics Skeptical Speculator Economics Unbound Economic Dreams William Polley Calculated Risk General Glut Angry Bear Stumbling and Mumbling Econbrowser Cynic's Delight Economist's View Prudent Investor EconTech Tufte's Economics Classes Aplia Econ Blog Greg Mankiw's Blog Pienso Conservation Finance Hungary Economy Watch Loading... 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